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While it is not easy for
the Directorate to objectively conclude on the success or otherwise of a
project, a number of factors have become so obvious over the years,
especially since the project gathered momentum in 1999, that they need to be
stated as indicators for the Way Forward. Thus:
a.
While the project successfully institutionalized the protected
areas in terms of the Philippines Constitution of 1987, provided viable
participatory management structures and tools, and satisfied, to some
extent, the Convention on Biological Diversity,
there has been a failure to fully engage all the stakeholders, including,
importantly the most marginalized poor people and the most highly placed
national policy makers. The cause of this failure is twofold: first, the
project did not get to grips early enough with its IEC activities (see
especially subsection 3.5.1, below) and second, just plain lack of time – five years
is not long enough even if everything goes well.
b.
The Protected Area Planning processes have been the most
innovative of the project’s activities, testing the NIPAS Act (and all the
ramifications arising from it), especially in terms of stakeholder
participation. In this respect the NIPAS legislation has proved to be
appropriate and workable.
c.
The MIS outputs are the project’s single most successful
activity. (See especially subsection 3.4.8, below).
d.
The need to deal with poverty amongst local stakeholders is
essential but small-scale livelihood projects are not the answer and indeed
can exacerbate the problem.
e.
In the end, the source of the project’s successes was threefold:
sound management and administration; the ability, after much debate with the
EU delegation, to be able to pay sufficiently high salaries in order to
recruit a few excellent local staff; and the fact of the two co-directors
being able to work well together as a team.
f.
The source of the failures was lack of time. Although adverse
criticisms might be made about the project design, the FM and early
management dysfunctions, all these problems were ultimately overcome.
g.
There is a need for the European Commission, as the funding
agency, to develop mechanisms to ensure that the best possible TA team is
put into the field. In the Philippines, where there is a large pool of
technical expertise, international standard project management is what the
EU should provide above all else.
h.
The DENR, as an institution, is capable of developing and
managing protected areas but is handicapped by limited funding and cannot be
expected to take over foreign assisted projects that have extended the DENR
work-load, unless other fund sources are encouraged to complement and
sustain project operations.
i.
There needs to be many more years of research into the ecological
dynamics of the NIPAP sites.
j.
Landrovers are entirely inappropriate as they cannot easily be
maintained locally in the Philippines and because spare parts are expensive.
After-service care is very poor.
k.
Both review missions were inadequate, each having a poor team
spirit and insufficient time to get to grips with the complexities of NIPAP.
The pre-completion mission team, in particular, appeared to be imbibed with
a strange philosophy that pre-disposed it against the value of conservation
efforts in the Philippines.
Dr. Antonio C. Manila / Nick Ashton-Jones
Co-Directors, 23rd March 2001
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